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Abstract
Armed conflict actors frequently target civilian populations. Thus, an improved under-
standing of such behaviour could pave the way to reducing it. We use the Civilian Targeting
Index (CTI) and a broad array of geo-referenced data to investigate the spatio-temporal
and economic dynamics of civilian targeting by conflict actors in Africa. Two main insights
are generated. First, the civilian targeting behaviour of African non-state conflict actors
is strongly influenced by the behaviour of other proximate actors. In particular, non-state
actors tend to increase their civilian targeting after nearby non-state actors have done so.
Possible mechanisms to explain such spatial spillovers include emulation and retaliation.
Second, a negative relationship between economic activity and civilian targeting exists and
applies to both state and non-state actors. In addition, CTIs of non-state actors tend to
increase with population density, the geographical spread of their conflict activity and con-
flict duration. State actors have higher average CTI’s than non-state actors do but the gap
between the two actor types tends to close during long-duration conflicts.
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Violence against civilians has been a deplorable element of numerous conflicts over the years
and across all world regions. The most recent examples include conflicts in Syria, Yemen,
Afghanistan, Thailand, Mali, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, just to name a
few. In 2018 alone, intentional attacks on civilians took place in 30 countries and killed 4,515
people (Pettersson et al., 2019). Nonetheless, the mechanisms leading to attacks on civilians and
their spread are still not fully understood. Improved data and developments in econometrics
have given way to a wave of studies that investigate factors that drive actors1 to target civilians
rather than battle with their armed counterparts (e.g., Joshi & Quinn, 2017; Raleigh & Choi,
2017; McDoom, 2012; Verpoorten, 2012). However, spatio-temporal diffusion of violence against
civilians has yet to be explored.
We contribute to the micro studies on violence against civilians and the literature on spatial
determinants of armed violence by asking whether civilian targeting spreads across space and
time. In addition, we test the hypothesis that conflict actors’ civilian targeting proclivity tends
to be a decreasing function of the economic resources available to these actors. Anderton (2014)
suggests that a well-resourced army will be able to directly challenge armed forces of its enemies
while largely avoiding committing atrocities that could compromise its domestic and international
attractiveness, hence its local support, funding and supply of soldiers. However, at low resource
levels direct challenges to opponents may be counterproductive, leaving attacks on unarmed
civilians as one of the few affordable and available tactics. Lack of resources may also lead to
low troop morale and a lack of tools for enforcing discipline (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006),
resulting in violent attacks on civilians. Additionally, we consider a range of possible correlates
of civilian targeting such as conflict duration, population density and the presence of minorities
(e.g., McDoom, 2014a; Raleigh, 2012; Verpoorten, 2012), treating them mostly as controls rather
than objects of primary interests. We go beyond the small N setup, which is prevalent in the
existing literature, and analyse a large sample of conflict actors over time. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that explores diffusion of civilian targeting by following each
actor’s activity areas over time. This allows us to show results that uncover patterns that are
common across actors and can be generalised to a variety of conflicts.
We focus on post-Cold War Africa where violence against civilians accounts for 35% of all
politically violent events (Raleigh, 2012), corresponding to nearly 5,400 incidents of one-sided
1We use the term ‘actor’ to designate organized groups participating in conflicts.
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violence between 1992 and 2010 (Sundberg et al., 2010). We distinguish between state and
non-state actors who have been shown to exhibit divergent behaviour towards civilians (Eck &
Hultman, 2007), possibly due to varying challenges in identifying enemy targets (Joshi & Quinn,
2017) or sources and ways in which they are able to draw resources to support their warring
activities. We observe that increased civilian targeting spreads from one non-state actor to other
proximate non-state actors, a result that is consistent with a ‘demonstration’ or ‘emulation’
mechanism proposed by Lake & Rothchild (1998). However, we do not find such effects for state
actors. This divergence for the two types of actors may be partly due to the smaller sample of
state actors compared to non-state ones. Or, perhaps, non-state actors react to their immediate
surroundings to a greater extent than state actors do. We also observe large and statistically
significant effects linking greater economic activity with less civilian targeting. This shows that
actors of either type tend to rely relatively less on one-sided violence when they can access a rich
economic base.
The structure of this article is as follows. The next section reviews recent literature on
the spatial spread of conflict and civilian targeting. The following three sections explain the
hypotheses, data and modelling strategy, respectively. We then present our results followed by
three descriptive examples illustrating how civilian targeting spreads across armed groups, space
and country borders. Finally, a short discussion provides some speculations on policies that
might reduce civilian conflict casualties and directions for future work on the subject.
Theoretical background and related literature
Conflict and geography
Analysis of the role of geographical factors in determining war-fighting strategies is probably
as old as war itself and goes back at least to the classic book of Sun Tzu from the sixth cen-
tury BC (Sun Tzu, nd). Recent research has investigated the spread of war through time and
space, sometimes borrowing ideas originally applied to the spread of diseases (e.g., Alcock, 1972).
Richardson (1960a,b), in his pioneering quantitative work, found that wars spread out rather ran-
domly across space. However, these early findings were overturned after the arrival of more and
higher-quality data plus more sophisticated methods. Thus, Most & Starr (1980) found a ‘bor-
der effect’ whereby a country’s war participation probability is increasing in the war activities
of bordering countries. Similar results have been obtained for different time periods (e.g., Starr
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& Most, 1983) and for the spread of cooperative, in addition to conflictive, behaviour (e.g.,
Kirby & Ward, 1987). The statistical robustness of these sorts of findings has been enhanced
considerably by the development of spatial econometrics (Anselin, 1988), specifically by the ar-
ticles of Anselin & O’Loughlin (1990, 1992) and O’Loughlin & Anselin (1991). These works
abandoned the traditional assumption of independence between warring groups, accounting for
both spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity. Gleditsch (2002), Ward & Gleditsch (2002),
Buhaug & Gleditsch (2008) developed spatial modelling techniques further within the armed
conflict context and consistently found spatial dependence in the existence of armed conflict
between proximate nations. Further research has investigated the correlates of spatial diffusion
of armed conflict, including ethnic ties, intergroup dynamics, natural resources, neighbouring
peacekeepers, mountains and land area (e.g., ?Buhaug & Gates, 2002; Braithwaite, 2006; Lake
& Rothchild, 1998).
This spatial diffusion literature has greatly advanced our understanding of armed conflict yet
it has drifted away from the centuries-long interest of war scholars in the spatial determinants
of the strategies of armed actors. Specifically, the modern focus has been at the macro level of
conflict onset/incidence, leaving micro-spatial dimensions of armed conflict largely unexplored.
Nevertheless, some works within this stream do dig beneath the country level to uncover cross-
border diffusion of conflict through ethnic groups. In particular, Buhaug & Gleditsch (2008)
find that contagion effects appear mainly in separatist struggle and suggest that transnational
ethnic ties could serve as a channel for war diffusion. This echoes Lake & Rothchild (1998) who
ascribed the spread of ethnic conflict to a ‘demonstration effect’ whereby warring actors learn
from neighbouring actors. This presents a close link to our work as we disaggregate down to
the behaviour of armed conflict actors and ask whether civilian targeting by one actor leads to
civilian targeting by other nearby actors.
Civilian targeting in conflict
There already exists an interesting literature on civilian targeting in conflict2 which could be
broadly categorized into three strands dealing with: (i) characteristics of victims, (ii) social
dynamics and behaviour of perpetrators, and (iii) organizational structures of perpetrator groups
and their access to resources. Within the first strand, Joshi & Quinn (2017) investigated the
determinants of which groups of civilians got targeted by rebels and governments in the civil war
in Nepal and showed that victims of one-sided violence shared key demographic characteristics
2See Valentino (2014) for a comprehensive review.
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with combatants killed in battle. Thus, a strong continuity in the characteristics of inhabitants
across space could drive the spatial spread of civilian targeting. For example, if a group is
targeted because of some of its traits and individuals with the same or similar traits inhabit
neighbouring areas, then the perpetrator may wish to target those individuals as well.
In the second strand, social dynamics and their impact on intergroup violence in Rwanda
were extensively studied in the works of McDoom who showed that mobilisation of social groups
to target other civilians follows a two-stage process. First, the emotions of distrust and fear
lead to polarisation of attitudes and perceptions of the target group as ‘others’ or legitimate
targets. Second, the presence of material and structural opportunities turns these emotions into
violence (McDoom, 2012). But even when these conditions are present, questions still remain
about which individual group members participate in killings and which do not. McDoom (2013)
showed that social influence within a person’s micro-spatial environment is a significant factor in
determining the likelihood of participation in violence. The evidence that participants in killings
are likely to come from the same neighbourhoods suggests that targeting of civilians can spread
over time and across space. This diffusion can be at its worst where population density is high,
leading to powerful social network effects (McDoom, 2014a), vigorous competition for land, jobs,
and other resources among groups and individuals (Verpoorten, 2012) and high accessibility
of civilians for targeting (Raleigh, 2012). These negative effects of social influences are less
likely to materialize in cohesive communities with high levels of trust and cooperation. Such
communities are better prepared to resist external attempts to raise divisions (McDoom, 2014b)
and thus the spread of genocidal ideas is more likely to be thwarted at the first stage of the
mobilisation process. The organizational and resource environments have also been shown to
matter for the allocation of lethal force by armed actors. Kalyvas (2006) focused much of his
work on explaining how actors choose between indiscriminate violence and selective violence.
The application of selective violence is a relatively resource intensive activity because accurately
identifying true enemies requires maintaining some degree of territorial control within which to
conduct expensive intelligence activities. In contrast, indiscriminate violence can be a resource-
cheap way to kill some enemies but at the cost of repelling people into the ranks of rival actors
as often happened under Nazi occupation (Kalyvas, 2006).3 Kalyvas & Kocher (2009) found
that during the Vietnam War rebels did indeed tend to use selective violence more in areas
3A more nuanced picture emerged from Schutte (2017) who showed that violence against civilians in Afghanistan
did not cause them to support the perpetrator’s adversary in the immediate spatio-temporal vicinity of attacks,
but it increased support for the adversary in further locations.
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where they had good, but not complete, control. There is a potential link between the control-
based theory of Kalyvas (also echoed in Raleigh & Choi, 2017) and the economic theory of
Anderton (2014) and Ferrero (2013) that proposes civilian targeting to be an ‘inferior input’ into
a war technology, implying that under certain conditions civilian targeting will be a decreasing
function of the resources available to an actor. This is reflected in the findings of Wood (2010)
who showed that weak actors kill more civilians than their more capable counterparts as they are
unable to deliver sufficient benefits to civilian populations that could ensure their loyalty. Wood
(2014) somewhat reconciles the control-based and inferior input theories by showing that severe
battlefield losses and resulting resource demands lead to an increase in attacks on civilians but
this relationship is conditioned on the degree of territory control and sources of actor’s financing.
Some of the above studies are similar to our work in that they contain a spatial or spatio-
temporal dimension (e.g., Joshi & Quinn, 2017; Schutte, 2017; McDoom, 2013), but most of
them consider only one or two countries or conflicts in their analysis (Wood, 2014, 2010; Eck &
Hultman, 2007, are notable exceptions). In contrast, our work is a large N study of conflict
actors that explores diffusion of civilian targeting across actors and over time, linking directly
to Hicks et al. (2011) and Lee (2015) who characterize each actor with a ‘Civilian Targeting
Index’ (CTI) measuring the percentage of deaths attributable to that actor that are classified as
intentional killing of civilians. Hicks et al. (2011) finds that the CTI is, on average, a decreasing
function of total deaths attributable to an actor. Lee (2015) shows that CTI’s of non-state
groups tend to increase over time. There could be economic factors in the spirit of Anderton
(2014) that influence these relationships. For example, holding a rebel actor in the field for a
long period of time may deplete its resources, driving it toward increased civilian targeting as a
cheap alternative to battling with a government. However, Hicks et al. (2011) and Lee (2015)
did not explore such possibilities.
The hypotheses
The literature discussed above provides several possible theories explaining the spread of civilian
targeting across space and over time as well as some evidence to support such a notion (e.g.,
Joshi & Quinn, 2017; McDoom, 2013). Nonetheless, those are low N studies that tend to focus
on one or two conflict episodes, whereas we aim to examine whether the diffusion of civilian
targeting can be generalized to a larger sample of actors across conflicts and years. This leads
to our first hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1 The civilian targeting spillover hypothesis
Civilian targeting, as measured by the CTI, follows a diffusion process whereby civilian tar-
geting by one actor spreads with a time lag to nearby actors.
It is plausible that behaviour of warring actors is influenced by behaviour of other nearby
armed groups, as suggested by Raleigh & Choi (2017). The first law of geography suggests that
such influences should decay with distance (Tobler, 1970). However, responding to the tactics
of other actors is likely to require some time to observe their behaviour and its consequences, so
we expect that there will be a time delay in the spatial diffusion of civilian targeting.
Our second hypotheses focuses on economics and resources available to actors and is motivated
by the ‘inferior input’ theory of Anderton (2014).
Hypothesis 2 The resource-scarce actor civilian targeting hypothesis
An actor’s civilian targeting, as measured by the CTI, tends to decrease as the resources
available to the actor increase.
We expect that actor’s reliance on violence against civilians decreases as their resource en-
dowment rises. A well resourced army will be able to acquire better armaments, recruit and
train more troops, and, consequently, directly challenge the armed forces of its enemies. Avoid-
ing atrocities against civilians could also be motivated by the actor wanting to avoid far-reaching
domestic or international repercussions that could adversely affect the actor’s attractiveness to
either domestic or international support bases and diminish its political position. At low resource
levels, a weak actor may be unable to mount a direct challenge against their opponent’s army
as this would likely end in a crushing destruction, leaving attacks on unarmed civilians as one
of the few affordable and available conflict tactics. Moreover, a lack of resources may lead to
low troop morale and inability to enforce discipline (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006), potentially
resulting in violent attacks on civilians.
We distinguish between state and non-state actors as they are likely to have different motiva-
tions to kill civilians. Joshi & Quinn (2017) argued that in civil war governments and rebels face
two distinct information problems when identifying opponents’ targets, resulting in adoption of
differing tactics in their treatment of civilian populations. Linking to our second hypothesis,
we argue that tactics employed by the two types of actors are likely to be influenced by the
way they draw resources. Governments typically have a tax base on which they can rely, at
least to some extent, and which often spreads beyond the geographic areas affected by localized
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conflicts. Similarly, they should find it easier to draw troops from parts of the country that
are not in conflict. They may also find it easier to attract help and support from their inter-
national partners (other states or intergovernmental organizations), but the same partners may
impose heavy penalties for violence against civilians by imposing sanctions or cutting foreign aid
flows. In contrast, the resources of non-state actors are likely to be less diversified. They might
rely on voluntary donations and memberships of their supporters and possibly proceeds from
some clandestine business operations, but if these prove to be insufficient then they may have
to resort to looting or forceful extraction of resources from the territories and populations under
their control. Not being a part of the international economic and political system, they have
fewer opportunities to receive support from abroad than their state counterparts. This, however,
means that they could be less susceptible to international pressures and consequently show less
restraint in treatment of civilians. Overall, we expect one-sided violence by non-state actors to
be sensitive to changes in the local economic conditions in the territory they control, whereas
government’s behaviour towards civilians is expected to depend on the economic performance of
the entire national economy.
Finally, we maintain a secondary focus on a range of possible correlates of civilian targeting,
that received some attention in earlier studies, such as conflict duration, population density and
the presence of minorities (e.g., Lee, 2015; McDoom, 2014a; Raleigh, 2012; Verpoorten, 2012),
considering them mostly as controls rather than as objects of primary interests.
Data
Our dependent variable is the Civilian Targeting Index (CTI) which measures civilian deaths
from one-sided violence inflicted by an actor in a given year as a percentage of total deaths
associated with this actor during the same time period (Hicks et al., 2011). CTI’s take values
between 0, when an actor is not recorded as targeting civilians at all, and 100 when an actor’s
lethal behaviour is entirely dedicated to civilian killing. We calculate CTI values for warring
actors operating in Africa between 1992 and 2010 using the data on one-sided and battle deaths
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Geo-referenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED; Sundberg
et al., 2010)4, which lists 283 conflict actors in Africa between 1992 and 2010. Of these, 189
actors (67%) have CTI = 0, 29 actors (10%) have CTI = 100, and the rest have CTI’s strictly
4The early and not geo-referenced version of the dataset published by Eck & Hultman (2007) covered the period
from 1989 to 2004.
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between 0 and 100. An advantage of the CTI is that, by focusing on the intensity of civilian
targeting within each actor’s tactical mix, rather than the absolute number of war deaths, it
ensures that our results are readily applicable to conflict actors of all sizes.
We then use the UCDP GED Polygon Dataset (Croicu & Sundberg, 2012) to construct
polygons representing geographical areas of each actor’s conflict activities within each year. A
UCDP GED polygon is ‘the smallest possible convex geographical area that encompasses the
locations of all UCDP GED events in each covered UCDP dyad within a specified time period’
(Croicu & Sundberg, 2012). Figure 1 provides an illustrative example of how UCDP GED
polygons are constructed. The dark points represent single battles or one-sided violence attacks;
a convex hull is then drawn to encompass all events belonging to a given dyad in a given year.
(a) GIA (Armed Islamic Group) in 2002 (b) Government of Togo in 2005
Figure 1. Composition of two UCDP GED polygons
For actors involved in more than a single dyad in a given year we construct polygons that
represent all the conflict activity of these actors within this year. Figure 2 shows how we construct
an activity polygon for the Government of Liberia which, in 2001, was involved in two dyads.
We drop split dyads (4.16% of the dataset) to avoid excessively large polygons covering large
geographic areas where no activity occurred.
We create 814 polygons in total which represent 34 state and 253 non-state actors over
the period from 1992 to 2010, dropping actors that did not cause any deaths in a given year.
We then calculate the distances between polygon centroids and build this information into the
spatio-temporal weighting matrix that we use in our regressions.
We then compute a range of polygon-specific exogenous variables which are summarized in
Table I. The data on population per square kilometre comes from the Global Human Settlement
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(a) Two polygons - one for each dyad
(b) A merged polygon covering both
dyads
Figure 2. The area of operation for the Government of Liberia in 2001
Table I. Descriptive statistics
All actors State actors Non-state actors
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
CTI 29.091 40.4 38.04 41.96 25.65 39.28
Night light luminosity 1.73 7.44 1.942 8.39 1.65 7.05
GDP per capita 1,861.43 1,954.12
Population density 453.95 1,899.01 362.76 1,431.56 489.002 2,050.54
Minorities 3.79 4.62 5.85 6.04 2.995 3.64
Area size (square kilometers) 82,296 204,164 165,748 299,621 50,221 140,031.5
Elevation (meters) 809.29 574.7 778.16 555.86 821.26 581.8
Years since outbreak 4.72 4.95 8.37 6.15 3.32 3.51
Cross-border 0.52 0.5 0.71 0.46 0.44 0.5
Polygons (1992–2010) 814 226 588
10
Layer (GHSL) project (EC-JRC, 2015) from which we obtain snapshot pictures of spatial dis-
tribution of human populations in Africa in the years 1990, 2000 and 2015. We then estimate
the population size in each of the remaining years, t, by picking the nearest year before and the
nearest year after year t for which the data are available, and assuming a constant population
growth rate between those years. Having population estimates for each year, we compute a mean
population density by dividing population size within each polygon by its area size.5 The US
Geological Survey’s Center for Earth Resources Observation and Science (1996) provides the
data on elevation above sea level which enables us to calculate mean elevation in meters for each
polygon. Our minorities information comes from the GeoEPR 2014 dataset (Vogt et al., 2015)
which geo-locates politically relevant ethnic groups listed in the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR)
dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). It characterizes Africa as inhabited by 247 ethnic minority
groups, with as many as 18 groups in Sudan and South Africa. We count the number of EPR
groups completely or partially contained within a polygon of actor’s activity, leaving us with an
average of roughly four minorities per polygon. The variable ‘cross-border’ is coded as 1 if a
polygon crosses an international border and 0 otherwise. We construct the variable ‘years since
outbreak’ by starting from the first year an actor appears in the dataset and counting forward as
long as it remains involved in conflict, allowing up to three years without lethal activity before
we consider an actor to be inactive.
We use two separate measures of economic activity. The first is national GDP per capita
according to the Penn World Table Version 9.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer, 2015). This variable
is an appropriate measure of resource capacity for state actors which generally have some degree
of national taxation authority. Non-state actors, on the other hand, will tend to have little or
no ability to extract economic resources outside their areas of operation, i.e., their polygons.
We cannot build local economic data from national income accounts but, fortunately, there is a
viable alternative. Thus, our second measure of economic activity is high-resolution light density
as measured at night by satellites and collated by the US Air Force Weather Agency and the
NOAA National Geophysical Data Center (2017). These data are available for years since 1992
and do a good job of representing localised economic activity (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou,
2013; Henderson et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 2010). We calculate mean night-light luminosity
5We obtain consistent regression results when we switch to either of two alternative sources of population data:
WorldPop (2016) and the African Population Database (Nelson, 2004). The former is available for the years
2000, 2005 and 2010 and we follow the above procedure to obtain estimates for the other years. The latter
contains information only for year 2000, forcing us to assume constant population across years.
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within each conflict polygon to proxy for economic activity.6 These two measures imperfectly
reflect the economic resources available to warring actors but are likely to be positively correlated
with these resources. Actors should be able to impose various taxes or loot with relatively good
success in relatively rich areas (Beardsley & McQuinn, 2009).
The remaining variables described in Table I serve mainly as controls yet it is still worthwhile
to speculate briefly on their expected signs. Working from the idea that civilian targeting is
mainly the province of relatively poor conflict actors, we would predict a negative relationship
between area size and CTI – greater resources are needed to control large territories than are
needed to control small territories. The costs of gathering intelligence on enemies are likely to be
higher in densely populated areas than in sparsely populated ones (Kalyvas, 2006), suggesting
that CTI’s will increase with population density. Rebels might be costly to find at high elevations,
leading to a positive association between elevation and CTI’s of state actors. Ethnic diversity is
a correlate of civil war prevalence (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002) and ethnic ties play a role in the
spread of armed conflict (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008), so the minorities variable may be linked
with CTI’s, possibly via some of the channels described in Joshi & Quinn (2017), and McDoom
(2014b, 2012). Governments often struggle to project their power into border zones (Buhaug
& Rød, 2006) across which rebels can flee to escape government forces. Thus, we might expect
CTI’s for state actors to be positively correlated with the border variable.
Empirical strategy
We hypothesise that actors’ behaviours will depend on those of nearby actors, probably after
some time lag (Raleigh & Choi, 2017). Therefore, we employ a spatio-temporal model that
includes temporally lagged neighbouring observations through a spatial lag operator and takes
actor-year as the unit of analysis. More specifically, we create a regressor from past CTI values
of neighbouring actors that are weighted to account for potential distance decay effects. This
variable captures processes of actors feeding off of one another while reducing endogeneity issues
in the estimation (Beck et al., 2006). Note that the inclusion of this spatio-temporal lag still does
not rule out the possibility that there could be unobserved spatial patterns or heterogeneity, e.g.,
6We use the Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series. When working with the data, we follow the
guide prepared by Lowe (2014). The DMSP-OLS data is not inter-calibrated across years which could potentially
lead to biased results in the spatio-temporal setting. To alleviate this problem, we run regressions with year
dummies as one of our robustness checks (results not shown, available from the authors) and observe that our
key results remain unchanged regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of year dummies.
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if some omitted variables are spatially autocorrelated, or if unobserved exogenous shocks follow
a spatial process (Elhorst, 2014). Therefore, we include a spatial lag in our error term (Dube &
Legros, 2014; Plu¨mper & Neumayer, 2010; LeSage & Pace, 2009).
Our main model, known as a SAC model (LeSage & Pace, 2009) or SARAR (Drukker et al.,
2013), is written as
ctiit = α+ λWctij,t−1 +Xβ + uit (1)
uit = ρWujt + it (2)
i 6= j
Given this model, ctiit is determined by the exogenous variables in X, temporally lagged CTI
values of other actors j, subject to a distance decay effect, which represents a spatial diffusion
process assumed to take a year to manifest itself (Anselin et al., 2008), and the error term, uit.
The latter breaks down into unobserved latent factors, it, and spatial spillover effects, ujt. The
parameters of interest, λ and ρ, measure the extent of spatial interactions in lethal behaviour
between actors. The former indicates whether a change in the civilian targeting behaviour of
an actor affects the civilian targeting behaviour of other proximate actors’ warfare. The latter
parameter shows whether exogenous shocks to one actor cause changes in its neighbours’ lethal
behaviour.
Most actors in our data are not observed throughout the entire sample period but rather
appear at some point in time and disappear after a few periods. Moreover, geographical areas
over which actors operate, and thus their attributes, change from year to year. Figure 3 provides
a sense of the spatial dynamics of armed conflict in East Africa with the colour-coded polygons
representing active actors in the region between 1999 and 2002. This unbalanced nature of
our panel does not cause problems because our estimation strategy does not require balance
as long as the weighting matrix W reflects the true underlying temporal patterns (Dube &
Legros, 2014).7 However, high unbalancedness prevents us from including a lagged value of
the dependent variable for actor i on the right-hand side and estimating what Anselin et al.
(2008) call a time-space recursive model. We employ the Geo-Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares
(GS2SLS) estimator which belongs to the family of instrumental variables (IV) estimators and
7The inclusion of temporal dimension is needed to avoid serious estimation bias. When units are observed
over time a spatial-only model assumes perfect memory and perfect anticipation of future events because all
observations receive the same temporal weights (Dube & Legros, 2014).
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uses the spatially lagged explanatory variables WX as instruments for Wy (Anselin et al., 2008).8
(a) 1999 (b) 2000
(c) 2001 (d) 2002
Figure 3. Conflict polygons in East Africa: 1999 - 2002
The W matrix
As noted above, we treat the data as a series of cross-sections stacked over T time periods.
The time dimension of the model alleviates concerns about simultaneous dependence which can
plague simple cross-section spatial lag models (LeSage & Pace, 2009). Appropriate construction
of the weighting matrix W ensures that temporal effects move forward in time, i.e. that future
observations do not affect current or past outcomes (Dube & Legros, 2014).
The model allows us to trace spatial diffusion over time. The spatio-temporal matrix W is a
row-standardised product of element-by-element multiplication of spatial and temporal weighting
matrices, W = S ⊗ T . The spatial matrix S has a standard spatial weighting matrix structure,
being symmetric with zeros on the diagonal and off-diagonal elements proportional to inverse
geographical distances. The temporal matrix T ensures that only the previous year’s observations
can influence the current value of the dependent variable.
Row standardisation of the spatial weighting matrices, i.e. dividing the cells by row sums
so that the weights in each row add up to one, ensures that the spatial lag coefficient estimate
8The estimation method is implemented using the Stata ‘spreg’ command (Drukker et al., 2013).
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has the same units as the dependent variable, thus allowing us to interpret it as the magnitude
of interdependence, and that there is an easy stationarity check (Plu¨mper & Neumayer, 2010).
However, these advantages can also distort the relative weights on the impacts that observations
are allowed to exert on one another, potentially undermining the validity of the interpretation of
results pertaining to distance decay (Elhorst, 2014). For example, consider two possible universes
of conflict actors, each consisting of three actors. In the first universe actor A has two neighbours,
both at a distance of 50 kilometres. In the second, actor B has two neighbours at a distance
of 500 kilometres. Under row standardisation actor A’s neighbours receive weightings of 1/2
each and actor B ’s neighbours receive weightings of 1/2 each. Thus, row standardisation only
recognises relative distances, ignoring the fact that actor A’s neighbours are much closer to it
in its universe than actor B ’s neighbours are in its one. We follow what seems to be the most
common approach in the literature and row-standardise our spatio-temporal weighting matrix,
W , for our main results. However, we also show that our results are robust to the alternative
specification of the weighting matrix.
Regression results
Table II shows the regression results for all actors combined, state actors, and non-state actors.
There are two state actor regressions: one with only night lights to measure economic activity
and another that adds GDP per capita. All variables are measured per polygon, except for
GDP per capita, which is measured at the national level, and years since outbreak.9 The key
parameters λˆ and ρˆ measure the extent of spatial dependence in the dependent variable and error
term, respectively. The inclusion of a temporal lag in the spatially lagged dependent variable,
Wyi,t−1 gives us confidence that we have overcome potential feedback issues and can interpret
the coefficients on right-hand side variables as direct, marginal effects (i.e. ∂yit/∂xit = β).
Spatial effects
The top two rows of Table II display the estimates for the spatial parameters. The positive
and statistically significant estimates of the parameter λ support the civilian targeting spillover
hypothesis for non-state actors. That is, there is evidence of positive spatio-temporal dependence
9We also ran regressions including a control for total deaths caused by an actor. The results did not substantively
differ from our reported results but are subject to endogeneity concerns since total deaths are in the CTI
denominator.
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Table II. All, state and non-state actors
All actors State Non-state
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spatio-temporal diffusion (λˆ) 0.402∗∗∗ 0.201 0.214 0.642∗∗∗
(3.25) (1.21) (1.33) (4.98)
Spatial error term (ρˆ) -0.00697 -0.0718 -0.0459 0.0423
(-0.13) (-0.54) (-0.36) (0.78)
Night light luminosity (log) -0.597∗∗ -0.200 -0.00896 -0.707∗∗∗
(-2.30) (-0.30) (-0.01) (-2.62)
GDP per capita (log) -15.08∗∗∗
(-3.86)
Population density (log) 2.853∗∗∗ 3.684∗∗ 3.020 2.393∗∗∗
(4.35) (1.98) (1.59) (3.62)
Minorities 0.880∗∗ 1.401∗∗ 0.747 0.457
(2.33) (2.53) (1.30) (0.87)
Area (sq.km, log) 2.146∗∗∗ 1.300 2.423 1.801∗∗
(3.24) (0.90) (1.59) (2.48)
Elevation (log) 0.549 -1.156 -3.072 1.894
(0.45) (-0.44) (-1.12) (1.40)
Years since outbreak 0.488 -1.071∗∗ -1.558∗∗∗ 2.481∗∗∗
(1.60) (-2.31) (-3.31) (5.34)
Cross-border 2.546 -12.83† -9.448 4.239
(0.76) (-1.85) (-1.34) (1.16)
Constant -25.27∗∗ 19.50 139.6∗∗∗ -42.33∗∗∗
(-2.56) (0.98) (3.82) (-3.98)
N 814 226 211 588
t statistics in parentheses. † p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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in the CTI whereby increases in civilian targeting by non-state actors lead to increased civilian
targeting by nearby non-state actors with a one-year time lag. The estimate of 0.642 on a scale
of -1 to +1 is large, with distance-weighted increases of ten percentage points for other non-state
actors associated with increases in the CTI of more than 6.4 percentage points, subject to the
distance decay effect. There is no comparable evidence of a similar pattern for state actors,
although the weaker results could, in part, be attributable to the smaller sample size.
We find no evidence of spatial dependence in the error term, ρ, suggesting that contemporary
exogenous shocks to one actor do not cause substantial changes to the behaviour of neighbouring
actors or there do not seem to be spatially autocorrelated omitted variables.
Economic activity
The magnitudes for the spatial variable discussed above are easy to assess since they are already
in CTI units. However, for the remaining variables we need to do some simple conversions to
understand coefficient sizes. Thus, Table III quantifies the magnitudes of all the statistically
significant (p < 0.05) effects given in Table II by displaying the estimated CTI responses to
one standard deviation changes to each explanatory variable, expressed both in CTI percentage
points and in CTI standard deviation units. For example, a one standard deviation increase in
the log of night lights luminosity reduces the CTI by nearly 4 percentage points which accounts
for 0.1 of a CTI standard deviation.
Table III shows that the estimated coefficients on night light luminosity and GDP per capita
support the resource-scarce actor civilian targeting hypothesis, with magnitudes that look fairly
large in percentage points of the CTI (5-11 points) but look smaller in SD units of the CTI.
That is, civilian targeting by both state and non-state groups appears to decrease as available
economic resources increase. Although state actors do not appear to respond to local economic
activity within conflict zones as measured by night light luminosity, their lethal behaviour does
seem to be affected by the performance of the entire economy under their control. This makes
sense since, unlike rebel groups and other sub-national actors, governments are able to extract
income from other, relatively peaceful parts of their countries and spend it on war efforts within
contested areas.10
10These two variables measure overall income within various areas and not resources directly available for actors
to deploy in their war efforts. Nonetheless, they should be positively correlated with deployable resources.
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Table III. Statistically significant effects on CTI of one standard deviation increase in an ex-
planatory variable
All actors State Non-state
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Night light luminosity (log) %-point -3.97 -4.92
SD units -0.10 -0.13
GDP per capita (log) %-point -11.29
SD units -0.27
Population density (log) %-point 7.38 5.70 6.57
SD units 0.18 0.14 0.17
Minorities %-point 4.08 9.79
SD units 0.101 0.23
Area (sq.km, log) %-point 6.40 5.105
SD units 0.16 0.13
Years since outbreak %-point -6.33 -9.59 8.73
SD units -0.15 -0.23 0.22
%-point – percentage point changes in CTI, SD units – standard deviation units of CTI.
Geographic and geopolitical factors
Population density, land area and years since outbreak are all positively linked with civilian tar-
geting by non-state actors, with a one standard deviation increases in these variables associated
with increases of between 5 and 9 percentage points in CTI’s.11 These findings can be viewed as
giving further, indirect support to the resource-scarce actor civilian targeting hypothesis; it might
be relatively expensive to control dense populations, patrol large land areas and participate in
long conflicts. We also find that state actors may be more likely to resort to civilian targeting
in areas with higher population density or larger numbers of ethnic minorities, although these
results are not conclusive. Interestingly, although, on average, state actors have higher CTI’s
11The estimates for population density may suffer from some upward bias as population density could be positively
correlated with the probability that violent incidents get reported and, therefore, captured by the UCDP system.
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than non-state actors do (Table I), the gap closes over time in prolonged conflicts.
Robustness check
The statistically insignificant estimates of the parameter of spatial dependence in the error term,
ρ, shown in Table II suggest that the CTI data generating process might be better represented
by a SAR model than by a SARAR one. Therefore, in Table IV we re-estimate the effects of
the spatio-temporally lagged dependent variable and the exogenous variables on CTI using the
SAR specification. In addition, we investigate whether our results could be an artefact of row
standardisation in the spatio-temporal weighing matrix. Thus, we make two sets of estimates:
Models 1 through 3 are based on row-standardised weights, while Models 4 through 6 use a non-
standardised weighting matrix. Table IV shows that there are no substantial changes resulting
from this exercise.12
Three examples
South Africa in the early 1990’s provides an illustration of the diffusion of civilian targeting.
Retaliation and emulation are likely candidates to explain the following pattern. In the 1980’s
there was violence related to the anti-apartheid movement in the coastal province of Natal. In
1989 UCDP records two civilians killed there by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In 1990 civilian
targeting in Natal by the IFP continued while the atrocities spread from Natal, committed by
the African National Congress (ANC), the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) and the Pan
Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), to the neighbouring Transvaal, committed by the IFP
and the ANC, and into the Orange Free Province, committed by the ANC, with a total of 21
civilians killed by the four groups that year. The same four groups perpetrated and the same
three provinces suffered civilian targeting in 1991, with the body count escalating to 29. The four
groups continued their targeting in 1992 with the violence spreading further to Cape Province
with 39 civilians killed. The list of groups and provinces held steady in 1993 and 1994 while
the number of civilians killed jumped up to 172 before falling back to 49 in the next year. This
spasm of violence targeting civilians abated after the historic election of 1994 (Human Rights
Watch, 1992; van Baalen, 2014), although AFC-IFP violence continues into the present.
The conflict in North and South Kivu of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) shows
12The magnitude of the diffusion parameter seems to decrease noticeably when we drop row standardisation due
to a large change in units.
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Table IV. Robustness check: SAR model with and without row standardisation
Row-standardised Without row-standardisation
All State Non-state All State Non-state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spatio-temporal 0.238 0.284 0.309∗∗ 0.0129† 0.0308 0.0276∗∗∗
diffusion (λˆ) (1.62) (1.56) (2.10) (1.96) (0.19) (3.63)
Night light -0.607∗∗ 0.00103 -0.798∗∗∗ -0.606∗∗ 0.0351 -0.801∗∗∗
luminosity (log) (-2.34) (0.00) (-2.98) (-2.33) (0.05) (-2.99)
GDP per capita (log) -15.26∗∗∗ -14.90∗∗∗
(-3.90) (-3.75)
Population 2.985∗∗∗ 3.028 2.776∗∗∗ 2.935∗∗∗ 3.078 2.698∗∗∗
density (log) (4.54) (1.59) (4.18) (4.46) (1.63) (4.09)
Minorities 0.956∗∗ 0.799 0.752 1.088∗∗∗ 0.735 1.015∗∗
(2.52) (1.38) (1.44) (2.91) (1.28) (1.97)
Area (sq.km, log) 2.133∗∗∗ 2.434 1.881∗∗∗ 2.210∗∗∗ 2.352 2.033∗∗∗
(3.23) (1.60) (2.61) (3.33) (1.53) (2.80)
Elevation (log) 0.467 -3.170 1.682 -0.0968 -3.217 0.724
(0.38) (-1.15) (1.26) (-0.08) (-1.13) (0.54)
Years since 0.485 -1.596∗∗∗ 2.332∗∗∗ 0.451 -1.508∗∗∗ 2.231∗∗∗
outbreak (1.59) (-3.33) (5.03) (1.48) (-3.17) (4.81)
Cross-border 2.498 -9.709 4.818 1.723 -8.866 4.251
(0.75) (-1.38) (1.33) (0.51) (-1.22) (1.16)
Constant -20.77∗∗ 138.9∗∗∗ -35.59∗∗∗ -13.05 146.7∗∗∗ -26.04∗∗
(-2.05) (3.78) (-3.35) (-1.40) (4.00) (-2.53)
N 814 211 588 814 211 588
t statistics in parentheses. † p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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two waves of the spread of civilian targeting, both to new actors and to higher activity levels.
Again, the patterns are potentially explainable by retaliation or emulation. In 2006 the DRC
government, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Mayi Mayi
killed 255 civilians in one-sided violence according to the UCDP data. By 2007 these three
groups were joined by the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) with civilian
killings escalating to 713. Violence held steady in 2008, with the same groups killing 731 civilians,
until they escalated up to 1,871 civilian fatalities in 2009. The arrest of CNDP leader Laurent
Nkunda in early 2009 led to a peace treaty between the government and the rebel groups,
reducing one-sided violence to 68 fatalities in 2010 and 76 in 2011. However, in 2012 civilian
targeting spread dramatically with the Mayi Mayi reactivating and M23 (mainly remnants of
the CNDP), Raia Mutomboki, the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS)
and Nyatura perpetrating 1,301 intentional killings of civilians. Year 2013 was still worse with
the same groups minus the Mayi Mayi and Raia Mutomboki intentionally killing 1,495 civilians.
One-sided violence is ongoing in the DRC although levels have fallen to slightly more than 70
per year between 2014 and 2016. Raleigh & Choi (2017) presents a more detailed study of this
action – reaction mechanism of civilian targeting in the DRC.
Our final example is West Africa between 1989 and 2004 where civilian targeting spread from
country to country, a dynamic that was probably fuelled more by emulation than by retaliation.
First there was one-sided violence in Liberia with the government, the National Patriotic Front
of Liberia (NPFL) and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPDL) killing 18
civilians in 1989 and 3,045 civilians in 1990 according to UCDP. Civilian targeting spread to
neighbouring Sierra Leone in 1991 after NPFL fighters crossed over and attacked government
troops. The government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) killed 660
civilians in one-sided violence in that year. RUF leader Foday Sankoh had links to the NPFL and
may have learned some practices from that group. The United Liberation Movement of Liberia
for Democracy (ULIMO) also formed in 1991 from Liberian ex-patriots and fought alongside
the government of Sierra Leone before re-entering Liberia. All these groups targeted civilians
throughout their existence. Between 1997 and 2000 three more groups started targeting civilians
in the two countries: the Kamajors, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Intentional targeting of civilians
spread to Liberia’s neighbour Ivory Coast in 2002 with the government, the Patriotic Movement
of Coˆte d’Ivoire (MPCI) and the Movement of the Ivory Coast of the Great West (MPIGO)




We stress two main findings plus a few intriguing possibilities. First, we identify spatio-temporal
spillovers whereby civilian targeting by non-state actors tends to spread to other nearby non-
state actors. Many factors, reaching beyond the scope of our article, could drive such behaviour,
including emulation of observed tactics, noticing that abusive actors are not punished for their
crimes, or simply revenge. Second, for both state and non-state actors we find evidence for
the resource-scarce actor civilian targeting hypothesis according to which civilian targeting is
decreasing in the resources available to conflict actors. Third, we also find positive relationships
for non-state actors between civilian targeting and population density, land area and years since
conflict onset. These latter results seem broadly consistent with the resource-scarce actor civilian
targeting hypothesis. A further implication of the years-since-onset result is that, although state
actors have higher average CTI’s than non-state actors do, the distance between the two tends
to shrink during prolonged conflicts.
Analysts who try to predict crises and policy-makers should be aware of the evidence that
civilian targeting spreads across space and time. Thus, policy measures aimed at one group
committing atrocities could have spillover effects outside the immediate neighbourhood within
which they occur. Moreover, the observation that resource-poor conflict actors pose special
threats to civilians provides some guidance regarding which civilians are the most vulnerable.
More specific policy advice will require further research. We obtain our results from African
data, including 5,397 recorded incidents of one-sided violence, between 1992 and 2010. Although
we can think of no reason why the relationships uncovered in this article would be particular
to just this period in African history, it remains to be seen how well these results generalize to
other times and places. Future research should focus on determining which mechanisms drive
the uncovered spatio-temporal spillovers of civilian targeting. We can ask, for example, whether
civilian targeting stems from emulation or retaliation? This may require field-based case studies
investigating the motives, planning and strategies of conflict actors. A large N study tackling this
question would require data on precise timings of events and, most importantly, linkages between
civilian victimizations and warring actors. If diffusion was observed between two conflicted actors
who attack civilians supporting their opponent then revenge would be a likely motive. On the
other hand, if civilian targeting was committed by proximate actors who are not in conflict
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with each other or who kill civilians not linked to either actor, then diffusion through emulation
would appear a more likely explanation. A promising avenue for future research, requiring the
availability of high-resolution spatial data, is the role that exploitable mineral resources play in
determining conflict strategies and the treatment of civilians. In general, we suggest that future
research on conflict should pay increasing attention to the geographic dimension of interactions
between warring actors and their immediate environment as well as among different warring
actors.
Replication data
The dataset and code for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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